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While considerable attention has been paid to the austerity experi-
ments in Europe, much less attention has been paid to austerity 
case studies from other parts of the world. This paper examines 
the case of Queensland, Australia, where the government has pur-
sued austerity measures, while making dire warnings that unless 
public debt was slashed and the public service sector downsized, 
Queensland risked becoming the Spain of Australia. The compari-
son is incomprehensible, given the very different economic situa-
tion in Queensland compared with Spain. This comparison con-
structed a sense of crisis that helped to mask standard neoliberal 
economic reform. While pursuing neoliberal economic policies, 
the Queensland Government has also been introducing draconian 
laws that limit civil liberties and political freedoms for ordinary 
citizens. This mix of authoritarianism and austerity has met con-
siderable resistance, and this dynamic is discussed in the paper, 
along with the predictable and unequal impact that austerity 
measures have had on the general population and social services. 
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In July 2012 the Premier of Queensland, Campbell Newman, 
declared that “Queensland risked becoming the Spain of 
Australia” ("Newman Makes," 2012, para. 1). The context 
for this statement was the lead up to a Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) meeting of all State and Territory 
Premiers and the Prime Minister of Australia to discuss a whole 
of government commitment to a new Commonwealth–State 
funded social insurance scheme for people living with a dis-
ability. The Queensland Premier made the comment as a justi-
fication for why Queensland would not be putting any money 
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on the table towards a trial of the new policy. He claimed he 
had inherited too much public debt from the previous Labor 
government. In another media interview the same month he 
said, “Queensland has been bankrupted—is on the way to 
being bankrupted—by poor and reckless financial manage-
ment" ("Queensland on Verge," 2012, para. 5). Crying poor has 
long been the rallying cry of state premiers when negotiating 
with the national government over funding for health, educa-
tion and welfare. However, comparing Queensland to Spain 
came as a surprise to even seasoned political commentators, 
given the absurd nature of the argument. In mid-2012 when 
the comparison was made, for example, Spain’s official unem-
ployment rate was 24.5% compared with Queensland’s 5.5%; 
the bank bailout in Spain was $125 billion alone, and economic 
growth was - 0.3%, while in Queensland growth was running 
at 1.4% in 2012. 
We could read the sensational comments by the Premier as 
a case of political theater, using Spain as a symbol of fear to con-
struct an apparent crisis and reminding Queenslanders about 
the social and economic upheaval that can happen if govern-
ments are not prepared to reign in expenditure through “tough 
measures,” such as job cuts and cuts to the welfare state. But 
perhaps we should read it analytically as a sign of the hegemo-
ny of austerity, a term that can be deployed as a miracle eco-
nomic cure regardless of whether we are talking about Spain 
or Australia, the past or the present, and regardless of all the 
evidence which shows that in the vast majority of cases auster-
ity simply doesn’t work (Blyth, 2013). Austerity might make 
for good politics, particularly for conservative governments 
seeking to shore up electoral support for pro-market reform, 
but it doesn’t make for good policy, as the growing evidence 
from Europe’s failed austerity experiments demonstrates 
(Blyth, 2013; Clarke & Newman, 2012; Krugman, 2012). At the 
heart of austerity is a belief that strategies of fiscal constraint 
can, counter-intuitively, produce expansionary effects in na-
tional economies, increase private consumption and invest-
ment and produce growth in gross domestic product (Clarke 
& Newman, 2012). 
In many cases, the effects of fiscal consolidation are con-
traction, not expansion. While there has been much discussion 
in the media and academic literature about the European cases 
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of austerity, particularly the Mediterranean countries of Spain, 
Italy and Greece, much less is known about how the discourse 
and politics of austerity has played out in the Australian 
context. Australia makes an interesting case study of the con-
trast between a Keynesian-inspired response to the recent 
global financial crisis and its effects, which was applauded 
by many international economists at the time, and a case of 
neo-liberal austerity and authoritarianism as practiced by the 
state of Queensland over the last two years. Such a contrasting 
case study is possible to examine because of Australia’s federal 
political system where there is a national level of government 
and eight state and territory governments and where it is not 
uncommon to have a government of one political persuasion 
in power at the national level and another party of a different 
political persuasion at the state and territory level. 
The first part of this paper will sketch some of these po-
litical differences and contrasting policy responses by way of 
providing context, before taking a more detailed examination 
of Queensland’s austerity measures and their impact on social 
welfare and the public sector. Here the discussion will focus 
on how the problem was framed, the policy measures that fol-
lowed and the link between restrictions on civil and political 
rights and the erosion of social protection and social services. 
The third and final part of the paper will briefly reflect on what 
sort of alternative politics might be possible in light of the aus-
terity critique. 
Australia and the Aftermath of  
the Global Financial Crisis
Australia was in a strong economic position at the time of 
the GFC; it had one the highest rates of economic growth in 
the developed world, largely based on a mining boom fueled 
by China’s growth and its demand for Australia’s commodity 
exports. Australia had a relatively low rate of unemployment, 
at around 5%, and a favorable exchange rate. The Australian 
financial system was also markedly more resilient, with a 
much lower proportion of sub-prime mortgage exposure com-
pared to the U.S. Moreover, during the crisis the Australian 
banks continued to be profitable and did not require any 
capital injections from the national government. The health 
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of the Australian banking system also facilitated the effective-
ness of the monetary and fiscal response to the fiscal crisis, 
particularly by allowing much of the large easing in monetary 
policy to be passed through to interest rates on loans to house-
holds and businesses, in stark contrast to the outcome in other 
developed economies (ABS, 2013). Australia’s resilience was 
also reflective of less documented institutional features, such 
as strong corporate governance and oversight, transparent 
legal structures and banking history (Ferran, Moloney, Hill, & 
Coffee, 2012). Government guarantees to commercial banks to 
safeguard against a possible banking collapse were also critical 
in maintaining confidence in the market and among citizens 
whose savings were being held by the banks. These institu-
tional features and economic position were important, but so 
were the social policy initiatives pursued during the financial 
crisis, not just in terms of scale, but also in terms of type. 
The government’s fiscal stimulus package, alongside the 
quick response by the Reserve Bank to cut the official interest 
rate, was a decisive factor. In 2009 the national government, 
led by the then Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, approved 
$42 billion worth of spending. This was only the first phase. 
The various phases of fiscal stimulus added up to about $95 
billion over two years. These comprise the $10.4 billion in 
cash payments that were announced in October 2008; $15 
billion in extra funding for the states (November 2008); a $4.8 
billion infrastructure plan (December 2008); the $42.5 billion 
package (February 2009); and another $22 billion in infrastruc-
ture spending (in the May 2009 budget). The Treasury told 
the Senate economics committee in September 2009 that the 
stimulus had added one percentage point to GDP growth in 
2008-2009 and would add 1.6 points in 2009-2010. “This trans-
lates into a level of GDP that is 2.75 per cent higher in 2009-10 
than without the stimulus,” it said in a submission. More to 
the point for thousands of workers, the Treasury added this: 
“The peak unemployment rate was estimated to be 1.5 per cent 
lower as a result of the fiscal stimulus” (Federal Treasury, cited 
in Crowe, 2013, p. 1). 
There has since been debate about whether the national 
government in Australia kept the stimulus going for longer 
than was necessary, which then added to the budget deficit. 
Whether this is the case is difficult to know. Regardless of the 
narrative that is used to explain Australia’s resilience, what is 
indisputable is that Australia fared better than most advanced 
economies during and in the years since the crisis began in 
2008. This observation has not been lost on some of the world’s 
notable economists, particularly those that are not opposed 
to demand-side economic management and an intervention-
ist state. Nobel Prize laureate and Professor at New York’s 
Columbia University Joseph Stiglitz (2010, p. 1) said in a 2010 
visit to Australia that, “You were lucky to have, probably, the 
best designed stimulus package of any of the countries, ad-
vanced industrial countries, both in size and in design, timing 
and how it was spent.” 
The evidence shows that most of the stimulus money 
was spent, rather than saved or used to pay down household 
debt (Leigh, 2009). Payments, which were paid through the 
tax system, were not taxable, and were ignored for the pur-
poses of calculating other income support payments. It was 
also possible for households to receive multiple payments. For 
example, a husband and wife who each earned $40,000 and 
had two school-aged children would each have received a Tax 
Bonus of $900, plus $1900 in a Back to School Bonus, resulting 
in an overall non-taxable bonus of $3700 for the household, 
or about 4 percent of that household’s annual market income 
(Leigh, 2009). It wasn’t all a success story, however. Other parts 
of the stimulus package were bungled through poor imple-
mentation, such as the Homeowners Insulation Scheme, which 
involved subsidizing households to have insulation installed. 
A number of the suppliers were involved in fraudulent claims 
for work that was never completed and other contractors were 
not complying with workplace health and safety regulations, 
resulting in house fires and a number of deaths of workers in-
volved in installing the insulation in houses. 
Despite these tragedies and implementation problems, 
the Australian Government’s response to the crisis was swift 
and decisive. For the most part, the state and territory gov-
ernments around Australia followed suit, borrowing money to 
spend on infrastructure projects in an effort to pump prime the 
economy and increase demand to avoid a recession. Certainly 
this was the path of the Queensland Labor government that 
was in power in Queensland from 2001 to early 2012. However, 
in April 2012 the Labor Government lost power in the state 
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election and was replaced by the conservative Liberal National 
Party (LNP) Coalition, led by Premier Campbell Newman. It is 
this change of government and the party's version of austerity 
that is discussed in the next section. 
Queenland's Austerity and Impact on Social Welfare
While the national government implemented a large stim-
ulus package when faced with a global economic crisis, the 
LNP Queensland Government that came to power in 2012 had 
a different response to what it perceived to be a major debt 
crisis. The construction of the public policy problem is impor-
tant to understand, as the earlier discussed comparison with 
Spain was part of a plan to establish a sense of crisis. The other 
components of the problem construction were fairly standard 
narratives for a conservative government—blaming the pre-
vious Labor government for spending beyond its means, and 
blaming the public service for being driven by self-interest, 
rather than serving the public. 
How much of this narrative is supported by the evidence is 
another matter. Certainly, the previous state Labor government 
borrowed, but they did so at a time when Queensland was re-
covering from the global financial crisis and natural disasters, 
such as floods that had ravaged parts of the state. The bulk of 
the borrowings were invested in infrastructure that developed 
the state’s services and economic capacity: roads, bridges, 
eight new hospitals, more than 200 kindergartens, 90,000 new 
jobs and economic growth approaching 5% (Remeikis, 2013). 
As Chris Richardson from Deloitte Access Economics argues, 
“it is both financially responsible and economically prudent to 
borrow to build infrastructure, and pay it off over the life of 
the asset” (Richardson, cited in Riordan, 2013). These nuanced 
distinctions were lost in the simplistic political messages and 
policy measures of the newly elected LNP government. 
Within months of coming to office, the Queensland 
Government set up a Commission of Audit to determine the 
state’s finances and make recommendations for what could 
be done to reduce debt. At the time there was criticism about 
the choice of the former Australian Treasurer, Peter Costello, 
to lead the Audit Commission’s review, given that he was 
the Treasurer in the Coalition Government that held office 
nationally from 1996-2007. There was even more criticism 
when the executive summary of the report was released in 
September 2012 over its methodology for estimating state debt, 
which was inflated. As Professor of Economics John Quiggin 
(2013) explains: 
The Costello report switched attention from net worth 
to gross debt. While this makes little economic sense in 
ordinary terms (if you were buying a company, would 
you care more about its net value, or its debt level), it 
might be important if the ratio of debt to net worth had 
risen a lot. Actually, gross debt was $24 billion in 1996, 
and is $64 billion now. The ratio of gross debt to net 
worth has actually fallen. (p. 1)
The Audit Commission report also failed to take into 
account the value of state assets. In short, the Audit Commission 
report painted a gloomy fiscal future for Queensland. The 
Audit Commission report claimed that gross debt would reach 
$100 billion by 2018-2019 unless urgent action was taken to 
pay it down. It is against this backdrop of an inflated crisis 
that the government justified its savings measures, which in-
cluded cutting 14,000 public service jobs (estimated to save 
the government $3.7 billion over four years). At the time, the 
government claimed nobody would be sacked, the numbers 
would be reduced through redundancies and not renewing 
contracts. The government also emphasized that no front-line 
workers would lose their jobs, a claim which was questioned 
by the unions. The Premier, when interviewed at the end of 
his government’s first 100 days in office, said: “What we need 
to do is find new, cutting-edge ways to deliver services and 
to cut down on waste and inefficiency, in particular in the 
back office” (Hurst, 2012, p. 1). The state government was also 
maintaining pressure on the unions by limiting the pay offer 
to Queensland public servants at less than 2.5%, claiming any-
thing higher would be unaffordable. It was ironic, then, when 
in the midst of this austerity talk, the government announced 
that it would be increasing state politician salaries by 9% over 
two years during 2012-2013. In its defense, the Government 
claimed the 9% was much less than an earlier cabinet decision 
which would have seen state politicians receive a 42% pay rise 
(Remeikis, 2013). 
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The Queensland Government also looked to make savings 
outside of their own workforce and they targeted commu-
nity welfare organizations, many of which are dependent on 
either Commonwealth or State grants for their operational ex-
penses. It is difficult to get an estimate on how many organi-
zations lost their funding or have had their funding reduced, 
but the cuts were extensive. It is important to remember that 
Queensland is a state that has historically been underfunded 
in terms of social welfare, which reflects the legacy from the 
1970s and 1980s, when the conservative government, led by 
the then Premier Joh Bjelke Petersen, underinvested in educa-
tion, health and welfare. Given this, there wasn’t a lot of fat 
to cut when the Newman government decided to withdraw 
funding for tenancy rights services, health services for gay and 
lesbian people, prisoner’s legal services, youth arts programs, 
women’s legal services, and diversionary court programs that 
were working to break the cycle of recidivism. A representative 
from the Community Legal Service argued that “Certainly, the 
government should consider whether it really wants to cause 
such adverse impacts to the ability of ordinary Queenslanders 
to have reasonable access to justice and, through that, equality 
before the law” (Keim, Marsh, & Moran, 2012, p. 1). 
The Queensland Council of Social Services (QCOSS) esti-
mated that in total there was a reduction in the amount spent 
on social welfare, housing and other community services in 
the 2012-13 state budget from 12.96% of total expenditure in 
2011-12 to 10.72% in 2012-13. The Department of Communities 
reduced funding to non-government community organizations 
receiving grants and subsidies by approximately $65 million in 
2012-13 (QCOSS, 2012). While these short-term savings may 
look like they will save the government money, the long-term 
cost may outweigh any savings. As the accountancy and con-
sulting firm Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) pointed out, care 
is required in making budget cuts, as the short-term financial 
benefit to government of these cuts will be far outweighed by 
the longer-term economic impact of a decline in essential com-
munity services. For example, the loss of preventative health 
programs such as public health nutrition, healthy living and 
chronic disease prevention programs will add further pres-
sure to an already overburdened health system. And while the 
Government expects to save $287.7 million from the removal 
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of the Skilling Queenslanders for Work (SQW) program, this 
needs to be balanced against the costs incurred through lost 
productivity and the need to invest in tertiary services due 
to entrenched and long-term unemployment (PWC, cited in 
QCOSS, 2012). All of these cuts came at a time when demand 
for social services, health and housing, has never been higher 
in Queensland. In terms of impact on social welfare clients, 
the Queensland Council of Social Service estimated that some 
73,000 clients across eight different programs in Queensland 
would no longer receive support (QCOSS, 2012). Cuts in 
welfare spending are not borne equally; they impinge direct-
ly on the poor, the young, the sick and the disabled (Levitas, 
2012). Austerity measures in Queensland are likely to produce 
new landscapes of inequality. Research shows that cuts to 
public service jobs and social services disproportionally impact 
women because public sector employment is predominantly 
female, and women, on average, are more reliant on public ser-
vices than men (Theodoropoulou & Watt, 2011). 
In addition to cutting services, democracy was also being 
thinned. For community groups that managed to maintain 
their funding, the Government installed so-called "gagging 
clauses" into their funding agreements, which state that: 
Where the organization receives 50 per cent or more 
of its funding from Queensland Health and other 
Queensland government agencies, the organization 
must not advocate for state or federal legislative change. 
The organization must also not include links on their 
website to other organizations’ websites that advocate 
for state or federal legislative change. (Queensland 
Law Society, 2012, p. 1) 
The Queensland Government’s argument is that not-for-
profits should be delivering frontline services and not partici-
pating in the public domain for government policy changes. 
The use of gagging clauses follows a similar move by the con-
servative national government, led by Prime Minister John 
Howard from 1996-2007. The Prime Minister and his govern-
ment also believed that the role of non-profit welfare groups 
in addressing poverty was getting them to return to a 1800s 
charity model of soup kitchens and poor relief, rather than 
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systemic advocacy and policy activism (Wright, Marston, & 
McDonald, 2011). The gagging clauses were removed by the 
incoming Labor government in 2007. The use of gagging 
clauses in Queensland has been highly criticized as an attack 
on basic political freedoms and as undermining the necessary 
checks and balances that underpin effective policy process-
es. As the Deputy President of the Queensland Law Society, 
Annette Bradfield (2012), wrote at the time in The Australian 
newspaper, “By making the restriction of free speech a con-
dition of funding, the government is robbing Queenslanders, 
and itself, of the ability to use information from frontline pro-
viders to consider sensible proposals for legislative reform and 
identify service efficiencies” (p. 1).
Were these cuts to services and public service jobs neces-
sary? Governments always have choices about how they con-
struct problems, identify possible solutions and justify their 
actions to the electorate. The government had chosen to put a 
negative spin on debt to justify savage cuts to public services 
jobs and social services. The narrative of debt and budget cuts 
to reduce a budget deficit had become the mantra of the new 
Queensland government ever since it was elected in April, 
2012. Clearly, running budget deficits indefinitely is not in 
the interests of Queenslanders. But the LNP’s cuts to public 
service spending are not necessarily in the state’s best interests 
either. A shortfall in revenue does not automatically imply the 
need for austerity. The shortfall could be addressed by raising 
taxes rather than cutting spending, or by using a mixture of 
both. But the ideological stance of the Premier and his Liberal 
National Party government is, of course, biased towards 
smaller government and lower taxes, so raising taxes (in areas 
other than household taxes) was never seriously considered 
(Eltham, 2012). 
The austerity cuts have not worked to reduce debt or build 
growth. Since coming to government in April 2012, state debt 
is up, economic growth is down, unemployment is up, and the 
state’s credit rating has not improved (Eltham, 2012). In July 
2013, the unemployment rate in Queensland was 6.4%, which 
was the second worst unemployment rate in the country 
behind Tasmania (ABS, 2013). When austerity measures drain 
confidence, economic activity declines, and the state’s revenue 
dries up. This is why Queensland’s debt situation is getting 
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worse, not better. However, to believe the narrative of the 
Premier and his front bench colleagues, it is all the fault of the 
previous Labor government. Rather than looking to the past 
for blame, he may be better advised to look at Europe and take 
note of the simple observation that Mike Smith, CEO of the 
ANZ bank, made recently on the ABC’s Inside Business about 
austerity in Europe: “All this austerity doesn’t work. You’ve 
got to create some stimulus as well” ("Mike Smith," 2013).
While the government has said it must cut costs to reduce 
public debt, it has shown that some activities are priorities and 
others are not. There are multiple examples of this over the last 
two and half years. One of the first acts of the new Government 
in Queensland was to scrap the Premier’s Literary Awards, 
worth $200,000. At the same time, the government went ahead 
with a promised grant of $200,000 to help fund the next series 
of Big Brother reality TV. And, despite the crisis rhetoric in 
2012, the government managed to find $110 million to upgrade 
the racing industry statewide, including more than $30 million 
for the Gold Coast turf club. Clearly not everyone has to pay in 
an age of austerity. More recently, in late 2013, the government 
has managed to find $30 million to implement its "tough new 
anti-biker laws," which were introduced amidst a moral panic 
about "out of control bike gangs operating in Queensland" 
("New Laws," 2013). By introducing the legislation, the gov-
ernment has curtailed the power of the courts to make sentenc-
ing decisions, instead vesting powers in the executive arm of 
government, a move criticized by many in the community and 
judiciary for its failure to respect the doctrine of the separation 
of powers (Agius, 2013). Effectively, the passage of this legisla-
tion marries austerity with conservative authoritarianism.
A divisive and authoritarian style of political leadership 
in the context of austerity can be a dangerous mix. Silencing 
criticism through “gagging clauses,” reducing the right to 
justice for ordinary citizens, and reducing the discretion of 
the courts in sentencing goes against the spirit of democratic 
freedom, the separation of powers doctrine and parliamentary 
accountability in Queensland. This is where the particularities 
of the Queensland case come to the fore. Many Queensland 
citizens have lived through an authoritarian governing style 
under the conservative government, led by Premier Joh 
Bjelke Petersen, during the 1970s and 1980s. The dictatorial 
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style of governance and corruption that characterized that 
government eventually led to its downfall when a judicial 
inquiry was set up by Tony Fitzgerald. So while the current 
Premier of Queensland Campbell Newman seeks to tap into a 
global narrative about the virtue of austerity, his authoritarian 
push for achieving his ends may be derailed by another nar-
rative about Queensland with a different moral tale—ignore 
the political lessons of the past at your own peril. As Tony 
Fitzgerald said in his criticism of the politics and policies of the 
Newman Government, “For what it’s worth, my impression is 
that most Queenslanders don’t want to revisit the dark days of 
political caprice and corruption” (2013, para. 2). 
From Local to Global: Reflections on  
Austerity and Social Welfare
Queensland is not alone in marrying austerity politics 
with state authoritarianism. The violent crackdown on street 
protesters in the UK, Greece, and Spain, reveals the lengths 
to which governments will go to enforce their austerity poli-
cies. A new report published by the International Network of 
Civil Liberties Organizations has chronicled the global trend 
by “democratic” states towards an increased tendency to crim-
inalize dissent and utilize excessive legal and physical force 
against lawful demonstrations against political authority. The 
research identifies a convergence among countries such as 
the United States, Israel, Canada, Argentina, Egypt, Hungary, 
Kenya, South Africa and Britain towards the increasing mili-
tarization of policing, justified in the name of fighting terror-
ism, but predominantly employed against mass domestic pro-
tests (Kennedy, 2013). Other research has examined the link 
between austerity and authoritarianism in Europe and found 
that while autocracies and democracies show broadly similar 
responses to budget cuts, countries with more constraints on 
the executive arm of government are less likely to see social 
unrest after austerity measures (Ponticelli & Voth, 2011). The 
state can obviously choose to respond to protests against neo-
liberal austerity in a variety of ways. 
In this context, it is worth pointing out that Brisbane, the 
capital of Queensland, will be hosting the G20 summit in 2014. 
Civil liberty and human rights groups have already raised 
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concerns about the introduction of the G20 (Safety and Security) 
Act, which passed the Queensland Parliament in November 
2013. The law allows the police commissioner to list people 
prohibited from entering secure zones in Brisbane and Cairns 
during the November 2014 summit. Police will also be allowed 
to detain unauthorized people found inside secure areas. The 
Police Minister, Jack Dempsey, says legitimate protests will be 
allowed, but they will act on intelligence from sources includ-
ing foreign and domestic security services. Protest groups at 
previous G20 summits included a mix of non-profits, church 
groups, trade unions, and peace groups. These groups protest-
ed against excessive corporate profit, unfair trade deals and 
militarism.
According to the sociologist Loic Wacquant (2011) these 
tough law and order responses to social protest against neo-
liberal austerity or economic globalization reflect a growing 
convergence of the logic of prisonfare and workfare in 
Anglophone welfare states: 
The downsizing of public aid, complemented by the 
shift from the right to welfare to obligation of workfare 
(that is, forced participation in subpar employment as 
a condition of support), and the upsizing of the prison 
are the two sides of the same coin. Together, workfare 
and prisonfare effect the double regulation of poverty 
in the age of deepening economic inequality and 
diffusing social insecurity. (p. 34)
Racialized backlashes are also coming to the fore in coun-
tries that have implemented tough austerity measures. Violence 
against immigrants as a response to domestic economic inse-
curity is on the rise in a number of European countries, fueled 
by the propaganda of extreme right wing political parties. The 
labor market economist Guy Standing (2011) discusses this 
phenomenon in his book The Precariat, where he draws the dis-
tinction between a progressive politics of hope in responding 
to economic insecurity (in which the state implements univer-
sal policies to provide a basic measure of economic security) 
and a politics of inferno, in which immigrants are demonized 
and constructed as scapegoats. 
Given the social, political and economic consequences of 
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austerity, it is difficult to fathom why governments persist 
with its implementation. It is not simply a case of no other al-
ternatives, as Mark Blyth (2013) shows in his exhaustive analy-
sis of the origins of austerity. He suggests the answer to this 
question lies in the power of economic ideas, particularly the 
variants of liberalism. He is referring to the sensibility within 
liberalism that sees the state as something to be minimized, 
avoided, curtailed, and certainly not to be trusted. This view 
of the state, however, misses Polanyi’s (1944) enduring ana-
lytical point that there is nothing natural about markets; states 
make markets as much as markets make states through mul-
tiple forms of regulation. Liberal economic thought remains 
oblivious to these facts, and as a result, contemporary neolib-
erals who argue for austerity come at the issue with an anti-
statist neuralgia that produces “cut the state” as the default 
answer, regardless of the question asked or its appropriateness 
(Blyth, 2013, p. 99). And unlike forms of austerity in the past, 
such as that in post-war Europe which included a powerful 
nation-building narrative, it is not clear what the benefits of 
sacrifice of contemporary austerity are, particularly as the fi-
nancial pain is not been being borne equally. Deepening social 
inequalities have induced both discomfort and discontent, 
making the popular austerity claim that “we are all in this to-
gether” simply implausible (Clarke & Newman, 2012, p. 314). 
Nonetheless, it seems we will be faced with repeating the 
economic mistakes of the past until the parties implementing 
austerity measures are voted out, or the pressure from col-
lective opposition is sufficient enough challenge to this par-
ticular form of path dependency. There are many individuals 
and groups in the community who are not satisfied with the 
aim of austerity measures being a case of restoring "business 
as usual." For these groups, business as usual is no longer so-
cially or ecologically viable. Perhaps one of the lessons from 
the austerity case of Queensland, as well as in Europe, is to 
use other political theories to analyze challenge and resistance 
than those offered by institutional approaches. 
A great deal of resistance against austerity happens on 
the streets and in other public spheres. In the Queensland 
case, trade unions have continued to provide an indispens-
able means of defending the basic conditions of workers 
in the face of public sector job cuts. More recently, new 
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coalitions of civil liberty groups and lawyers are emerging to 
challenge the erosion of procedural rights, access to justice, and 
the abuse of executive power associated with authoritarian 
austerity. Elsewhere, in countries like the UK, other forms of 
collective organization are emerging, such as the Social Work 
Action Network (SWAN), to bring together front-line workers, 
students, academics and service users to discuss, debate and 
challenge marketization in social work and the oppression of 
migrants and asylum seekers (Ferguson & Lavalatte, 2013, p. 
107). 
These social movements that seek to revive the promise of 
fairness and solidarity are providing important counterpoints 
to the faith-based politics and practical failures associated 
with austerity. Whether these forms of resistance can be effec-
tive in convincing governments to change direction remains 
an open question. A pessimistic reading of the future would 
suggest that we can look forward to a continuation of the dan-
gerous mix of more austerity and more authoritarianism for 
some time yet (Clarke & Newman, 2012). A more optimistic 
reading might suggest that the appeal of austerity and reduced 
consumption lies in the fact that they carry, at some level, the 
desire for a different, more solidaristic and convivial way of 
life—and it is this that we need to imagine, improvise and 
create (Levitas, 2012, p. 339). Bringing these different possibili-
ties back to the local case of Queensland, we might conclude 
that the dangerous mix of unequal austerity and authoritarian 
rule serves to remind Queensland citizens what they fought to 
overcome in the recent past, and it is this political memory that 
may help to mobilize effective resistance in the present. Many 
of the placards and flyers used in street protests in Queensland 
are making direct links between the new Premier and the 
notorious conservative state leader from the past, Joh Bjelke-
Petersen. For example, one of the recent postcards distributed 
at a rally outside parliament read “You’ve got to be Joh-king.”
Conclusion
The comparison between the federal and the state gov-
ernment in the beginning of the article highlights that politi-
cal ideology matters when it comes to responding to crises. 
For the national Labor government it had a wider range of 
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ideas laying around to dust off and apply given its intellectual 
heritage through the post-war nation building years; hence, 
the revitalized Keynesian-inspired fiscal stimulus response. 
Whereas the Liberal National Party in Queensland was con-
strained by its own past, ideas that were formed as a direct re-
action against post-war spending. Liberal-conservatives have 
a view of the state which can be summed up as “can’t live with 
it, can’t live without it, don’t want to pay for it” (Blyth, 2013, 
p. 14). But the desire to apply austerity is not just ideological. 
There are good reasons for wanting to clear the balance sheets 
of sovereign states and ensuring the banking sector doesn’t 
collapse. However, bailing-out can lead to further debt, debt 
leads to deeper crisis, and crisis leads to tough austerity. This 
sequence can be avoided as there are moments of choice, which 
the Australian case illustrates. There are also cases within 
Europe that illustrate the effect of different choices, such as the 
comparison between Ireland and Iceland, where Iceland let 
the banks fail and has done well in its recovery phase, while 
Ireland bailed out the banks and  condemned itself to a genera-
tion of misery because of it (Blyth, 2013, p. 231).
In the case of Queensland the answer to the question 
framed in the title of the paper is a simple “yes,” the cure is 
worse than the disease. The Queensland government, elected 
in April 2012, has exaggerated the state debt problem, made 
drastic budget cuts, constrained the voice of community-based 
advocacy organizations and weakened both civil liberties and 
the power of the judiciary to act independently. Both democ-
racy and the welfare state are weaker as a result. Predictably, 
the economy hasn’t responded as promised. Unemployment 
remains historically high, investment is down, and debt has 
increased in Queensland. The protests against these reforms 
are continuing. Queensland trade unions continue to organize 
rallies and challenge what they perceive as restrictive indus-
trial relations laws and staffing cuts. The legal fraternity and 
civil liberties groups are banding together to fight draconian 
laws that restrict political freedoms and fundamental civil 
rights. Parts of the community welfare sector have been vocal 
in their opposition to service cuts and they have had some 
limited success in getting the Federal Government to fund, for 
a limited time, some of the tenancy services withdrawn by the 
Queensland Government. In the context of the Queensland 
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case study of austerity, it is important to note that the 
advancement of social and economic rights depends on po-
litical freedoms and strong parliamentary democracy and 
transparency in decision making. These issues have particular 
resonance in Queensland, given its recent political history of 
corruption and secrecy. In this respect, there are others costs to 
austerity that are not so easily calculated, such as the crisis of 
a loss of trust in governments that can result from a carefully 
constructed crisis, a pre-determined policy response and deep-
ening social inequalities. 
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